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Trolley problemsMany people judge that it is permissible to harm one person in order to save many in some
circumstances but not in others: it matters how the harm comes about. Researchers have
used trolley problems to investigate this phenomenon, eliciting moral judgments or behav-
ioral predictions about hypothetical scenarios where ﬁve people can be saved at the cost of
harming one other person. We operationalized trolley problems in the laboratory, with eco-
nomic incentives and real-life consequences, allowing us to observe not only judgments but
actual decisions. We varied whether the ﬁve were saved by clicking a switch that diverted
the harm to the one or by dragging the one in front of the harm. We found differences in
moral judgments between the two tasks, but no differences in behavior. The judgments
of actors and observers also differed, with observers judging it more right to act. Our results
suggest that the difference between moral judgments and actions arises because partici-
pants think that doing the right action still involves doing something morally discreditable,
and that the morality of taking action does not exhaust the normative reasons for acting.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CCBY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Trolley problems were devised by philosophers in order to investigate why it is permissible to cause a harm to one person
in order to save many in some circumstances but not in others (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1976, 1985). The paradigm trolley
problem is Side-track: There is a runaway trolley that threatens to kill ﬁve men on the track ahead. An agent can save the
ﬁve by switching a lever that will divert the trolley onto a Side-track. However, on the Side-track is one man, who would
be killed. This contrasts with Footbridge, where the agent can save the ﬁve by pushing a large man off a footbridge in front
of the trolley, stopping the trolley but killing the one. In both cases, the decision is whether to take an action that results in
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the trolley in Side-track but not to push the man in Footbridge. It matters how the harm to the one and the saving of the ﬁve
come about.
There is a lot of evidence that people make different moral judgments in hypothetical Side-track and Footbridge prob-
lems (Gold, Pulford, & Colman, 2013; Greene et al., 2009; Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 2007; Mikhail, 2011).
However, there is little evidence about people’s actual behavior. Some previous experiments on actions in moral dilemmas
have asked participants to predict their own behavior (e.g. Bartels, 2008; Petrinovich & O’Neill, 1996; Schaich Borg, Hynes,
Van Horn, Grafton, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006; Tassy, Oullier, Mancini, & Wicker, 2013). Predictions of behavior have been
shown to be notoriously unreliable (Osberg & Shrauger, 1986; Vallone, Grifﬁn, Lin, & Ross, 1990). They may be especially
problematic in moral dilemmas, because people’s predictions may be biased toward whatever response they think is more
socially desirable, even if this would not be reﬂected in their actual behavior (Koritzky & Yechiam, 2010). The best way to
discover what people would do is to observe their actions, but we cannot operationalize life and death trolley problems in
the laboratory.
Gold et al. (2013) found, using hypothetical scenarios, that the difference in moral intuitions between Side-track and
Footbridge is preserved when the outcomes are economic harms. This suggests that we can study trolley problems using
the methodology of experimental economics, which has already been used to investigate moral behaviors such as altruism,
fairness, trust, cooperation, and reciprocity (e.g. Andreoni, Brown, & Vesterlund, 2002; Andreoni & Miller, 2002; Berg,
Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999, 2006; Houser & Kurzban, 2002). In this article,
we report a laboratory experiment, comparing judgments and behavior in real-life Side-track and Footbridge scenarios,
where decisions resulted in actual small economic harms to one or to ﬁve. We investigate whether there are behavioral
differences between different trolley problems, what the patterns of moral judgments are in real-life trolley problems,
and whether behavior corresponds to moral judgments.
1.1. Behavior in trolley problems
As far as we know, there are no previous comparisons of behavior in real-life trolley problems, but there are some rele-
vant precursors. Navarrete, McDonald, Mott, and Asher (2012) studied behavior in Side-track in a virtual reality environment
and found that 90.5% of participants turned the trolley. This is similar to the percentage of people who judge turning the
trolley to be morally permissible in hypothetical scenarios. However, despite the heightened level of realism, the virtual real-
ity environment still does not lead to actual outcomes for real people.
Côté, Piff, and Willer (2013) ran what was effectively a hypothetical version of Footbridge with small economic harms,
asking participants whether they would take money from one other participant to beneﬁt three others. This set-up is anal-
ogous to Footbridge for the following reason: An important difference between Side-track and Footbridge, according to
moral philosophers, is that in Side-track the harm to the one occurs as a foreseen side effect when saving the ﬁve, whereas
in Footbridge harming the one is a necessary means to saving the ﬁve. (If the one person was not there, then turning the train
would still save the ﬁve in Side-track but the ﬁve in Footbridge could not be saved.) In Côté, Piff, andWiller’s study, the one is
harmed as a means to beneﬁt the three, hence it is analogous to Footbridge but with small economic harms. They found that
60% of their participants said that they would take the money. However, the decisions were only hypothetical; the outcomes
were not actually realized.
Our experimental design is based on a task used by Hsu, Anen, and Quartz (2008) who, while investigating the brain
regions involved in trade-offs between equity and efﬁciency, used a computer animation where participants could ﬂip a
switch to divert a threat from one group of children to another. The outcomes were actually implemented, using small eco-
nomic incentives. Gold, Colman, and Pulford (2014) adapted this methodology to study cultural variations in Side-track, ﬁnd-
ing that Chinese participants were less likely to divert the threat than British.
None of the preceding experiments compared behavior in Side-track and Footbridge. In this paper, we use the samemeth-
odology as Gold, Colman et al. (2014), supplemented with a Footbridge variant, to compare behavior and moral judgments in
Side-track and Footbridge scenarios with real economic outcomes.
1.2. Relationship between behavior and moral judgments
Another reason to implement a real-life trolley task is to elicit moral judgments about a real situation, and to compare
judgments with behavior. It is not obvious that moral judgments made in hypothetical situations will be the same as moral
judgments made in real-life situations with actual consequences (FeldmanHall et al., 2012; Gold, Pulford, & Colman, 2014),
or that behavior in trolley problems will correspond to moral judgments. People’s actual moral behavior often does not live
up to the moral attitudes that they express, not even that of ethicists (Schwitzgebel & Rust, 2014). People’s predictions of
their behavior in moral dilemmas are more utilitarian than their moral judgments, so that they are more likely to predict
that they would harm one to beneﬁt many than they are to judge that it is acceptable to do so (Kurzban, DeScioli, & Fein,
2012; Tassy et al., 2013).
Tassy et al. (2013) suggest three possible explanations for the divergence between moral judgment and predicted
behavior. One possibility is that moral judgments and behavior are the outputs of separate psychological processes (Sep-
arate Processes Hypothesis). A second possibility is that differences between judgment and choice are due to akrasia, or
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from different perspectives (Differing Perspectives Hypothesis). Drawing on a distinction made by Frith and de
Vignemont (2005), Tassy et al. suggest that decisions about behavior are made from an ‘‘egocentric’’ perspective, which
represents the situation relative to the decision-maker and, hence, emphasizes the consequences for the decision-maker,
whereas judgments are made from an ‘‘allocentric’’ perspective, which represents the situation independent of the
agent’s own relationship to it.
These three different explanations for the discrepancy are potentially compatible, but they are not necessarily connected
and may not all be responsible for the differences between judgments and actions. The data that we collect bears on the
three hypotheses, as explained in Section 2.
2. Experimental design
2.1. Overview
We used a 2 (Scenario: Footbridge versus Side-track, within-subjects)  2 (Role: Actor versus Observer, between-sub-
jects) design. Participants were randomly allocated to be either actors or observers; their roles remained ﬁxed during
the experiment. Actors made decisions that inﬂuenced the amount of money donated to an orphanage in northern Uganda
(following a similar protocol to Hsu et al., 2008), and observers were asked about what decision another person in the
room should make. Our computer software recorded the time at which actors took action, if they did so, and the time taken
for observers to say what the actor should do (their ‘‘action judgment’’). Then both actors and observers rated the moral
rightness of the action. All participants responded to both scenarios with the ordering counterbalanced to check for order
effects.
Hence, as well as comparing moral judgments and behavior in Side-track and Footbridge, we are also able to compare
actors’ behavior with observers’ overall judgments of what should be done (relevant to the Akrasia Hypothesis), the moral
judgments and behavior of actors and of observers in the two scenarios (relevant to the Differing Perspectives Hypothesis),
and response times (relevant to the Separate Processes Hypothesis).
2.1.1. Akrasia hypothesis
Akrasia occurs when people act against their all-things-considered judgment, or their overall judgment about what they
should do. Experiments on moral decision making usually ask whether acting is morally acceptable or morally permissible.
However, there may be conﬂicting moral requirements that apply to a situation. Philosophers argue about whether it must
always be possible to weigh conﬂicting requirements and conclude that one overrides the other, or whether there are cases
where neither requirement overrides the other and we have what philosophers call a ‘‘moral dilemma’’ (Sinnott-Armstrong,
1988). (Thus, for philosophers, ‘‘moral dilemma’’ is a technical term, whose meaning differs from the everyday meaning used
in the psychology literature and in this paper.) In any case, asking about the morality of one possible action is not the same as
eliciting an overall judgment about what should be done, and it is the comparison of behavior and overall judgments that is
required to investigate the occurrence of akrasia. Asking actors for their all-things-considered judgments risks simply elic-
iting judgments that are consistent with their behavior. Hence we elicit the all-things-considered action judgments of
observers, who cannot inﬂuence the actor’s decision. The Akrasia Hypothesis implies that actors’ decisions will differ from
observers’ judgments about what actors should do.
2.1.2. Differing perspectives hypothesis
The egocentric perspective is that of the person making the judgment or decision, whilst the allocentric perspective is an
overview of the situation. Most trolley experiments are done from an allocentric point of view: the participant reads a nar-
rative about the scenario and is asked to judge an action that may be performed by one of the agents within. Since we have
both actors and observers, we can compare moral judgments and decisions made from an egocentric and an allocentric point
of view. If judgments are allocentric, then we would expect the moral judgments of actors and observers to be the same; and
if choices are egocentric, then behavior of actors and observers’ action judgments may differ.
2.1.3. Separate processes hypothesis
Our computer software recorded the time taken for observers to make their action judgments, which allows us to test a
dual process theory for judgments about moral behavior. Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, and Cohen (2001) and
Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, and Cohen (2004) argue that we have an intuitive, emotional response to Footbridge, which
drives moral disapproval of pushing the man in front of the train, but which can be over-ridden by moral reasoning. This dual
process theory of moral judgment predicts that people who judge that acting is morally permissible in Footbridge will have a
slower reaction time than those who ﬁnd it immoral—because of the extra processing time needed to make a reasoned
response rather than just to respond intuitively—but that there will be no difference in reaction time in scenarios such as
Side-track that do not elicit such a strong emotional response. We can use our reaction time data to test whether the inter-
action effect predicted by dual process theory occurs for judgments about behavior. If it does not occur, then that will be
consistent with the Separate Processing Hypothesis.
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There were 176 participants: 69 men and 107 women, aged between 18 and 37 years (M = 20.91, SD = 3.50). They were all
British and were recruited at the University of Leicester. Participants were either given course credits or paid £5 ($8) for their
participation. They were tested in groups of 15–20.
2.3. Procedure and materials
Participants read a consent form and were assured of the anonymity of their data. After granting consent, they read a bro-
chure from the Canaan Children’s Home, depicting the children’s plight and containing short biographies and photos of
twelve of the orphans (who were matched for age and gender).
Participants were told that we had endowed each of the children in the photos with a sum of money enough to buy them
one meal, and that each child would appear only once in the experiment. That amount was 30p (50c), although we did not
tell the participants this. We expressed the decision in terms of meals because of the vastly greater purchasing power of
money in Uganda than in the UK.
Participants then viewed an animation of a ball moving slowly across the computer screen towards a group of ﬁve chil-
dren, represented by their photos (see screen shot in Fig. 1). There was also a photo of a single child on screen, who was not
in the path of the ball. Participants were told that any children whose photo was hit by the ball would lose their meals. In the
Side-track condition, actors had the option to click on a switch that ﬂipped a lever, causing the ball to change direction and
head towards the single child. In the Footbridge condition, actors had to use the mouse to drag the photo of the single child
into the path of the ball that was heading towards the group of ﬁve, because the switch button and lever were absent. They
had 11 s until the ball crossed the dotted line in the middle of the screen, in which they could click the switch or drag the
photo. During this time, observers were asked whether the actors should click/drag (Yes/No) and to rate the statement that
the actor should click/drag (‘‘click’’ in the Side-track scenario and ‘‘drag’’ in Footbridge). For those actors who clicked the
switch and for all observers, the time taken until their decision was recorded.
Before participants made their decisions and judgments, they watched two demonstrations of the animation, one where
the lever was ﬂipped or the photo was dragged, and one where it was not. In the demonstration there were no pictures, only
blank rectangles, and the number of rectangles in each group was always ﬁve. The full animation took 17.5 s.
After the animation, participants were also asked to give a rightness rating: How wrong or right was it to ﬂip the lever/
drag the photo? Answers were on a 9-point scale (1 Deﬁnitely wrong, 5 Neutral, 9 Deﬁnitely right).
After completing their ﬁrst scenario (‘‘First Task’’), the process was repeated, from the demonstration animations
onwards, for the other scenario (‘‘Second Task’’).
3. Results
3.1. Descriptive statistics
Some basic descriptive statistics are given in Tables 1 and 2, showing the proportion of each group who took the action (if
they were actors) or said that the actor should take the action (if they were observers), and the mean rightness ratings of the
action. The distribution of rightness judgments was bimodal, with a major peak on the ‘‘right’’ side and a minor peak on the
‘‘wrong’’ side, so we also show the mean rightness ratings for the groups split by those participants who took the action orFig. 1. Screenshot from the Side-track condition of our experiment.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics, First Task (ﬁrst scenario completed by each participant).
Actors Observers
Side-track Footbridge Side-track Footbridge
Acted (actors)/judged the actor should act
(observers)
80.0% 90.9% 72.1% 81.0%
Right mean (SD) 5.78 4.91 6.41 6.26
(2.62) (2.43) (2.40) (2.36)
N 45 44 44 43
Took action (actors)/judgment about action
(observers)
No
action
Action No
action
Action Should not
act
Should
act
Should not
act
Should
act
Right mean (SD) 3.67 6.31 3.25 5.08 4.33 7.16 2.75 7.00
(3.08) (2.24) (2.50) (2.39) (3.09) (1.53) (0.89) (1.78)
Time taken (s) n/a 5.70 n/a 4.62 7.29 6.39 7.71 6.18
Mean (SD) n/a (2.34) n/a (2.46) (1.65) (1.65) (2.22) (1.86)
N 9 36 4 40 12 31 8 34
Table 2
Descriptive statistics, Second Task (second scenario completed by each participant).
Actors Observers
Side-track Footbridge Side-track Footbridge
Acted (actors)/judged the actor should act
(observers)
95.5% 88.9% 92.9% 90.9%
Right mean (SD) 5.41 5.51 7.02 7.07
(2.31) (2.43) (1.70) (1.56)
N 44 45 43 44
Took action (actors)/judgment about action
(observers)
No
action
Action No
action
Action Should not
act
Should
act
Should not
act
Should
act
Right mean (SD) 4.50 5.45 3.20 5.80 4.00 7.33 4.00 7.37
(3.54) (2.29) (1.79) (2.36) (1.73) (1.40) (2.58) (1.06)
Time taken (s) n/a 4.66 n/a 3.37 7.45 5.42 6.57 5.34
Mean (SD) n/a (2.33) n/a (2.27) (2.27) (1.92) (2.55) (2.26)
N 2 42 5 40 3 39 4 40
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the action.
There were order effects for behavior in the Side-track task, for both actors and observers. Actors who did Side-track sec-
ond were more likely to click the switch, v2(1, 89) = 4.91, p = .027, effect size u = .235 (small to medium effect), and observ-
ers who saw Side-track second were more likely to judge that the actor should click the switch, v2(1, 85) = 6.30, p = .012,
u = .272 (small to medium effect). There were no order effects for behavior in footbridge.
There was also a trend for observers who saw footbridge second to judge dragging the photo as more right than those who
saw it ﬁrst, 7.07 vs. 6.26, t(72.6) = 1.89, p = .063, Cohen’s d = .44 (small to medium effect). Otherwise, there were no order
effects in rightness judgments. Because of these order effects, we analyze data from the ﬁrst and second tasks separately.
3.2. First task
Surprisingly, those in the Side-track condition neither took action (actors) nor said that the actor should take action
(observers) more often than those in the Footbridge condition. If anything, there was a marginally signiﬁcant tendency
for those in the Footbridge condition to take action, or to say that the actor should take action, more often than those in
Side-track, v2(1, 174) = 2.28, p = .095. There was no signiﬁcant difference between the percentage of actors who took the
action and the percentage of observers who said that they should, v2(1, 174) = 2.25, p = .133.
A regression analysis of the rightness judgments reveals that, as expected, those who took the action (or said it should be
taken) gave signiﬁcantly higher rightness judgments than those who did not. In addition to this effect, observers gave sig-
niﬁcantly higher ratings than actors and those in the footbridge task gave lower rightness ratings than those in Side-track.
See Model 1 in Table 3. There were no signiﬁcant interaction effects, see Models 2–4 in Table 3, and the effects persist when
we control for demographic effects, although we also ﬁnd that older participants give higher ratings (see Model 5 in Table 3).
Many of our participants judged the action to be morally wrong even though they had taken the action or said that the
actor should take it. We can group our participants according to whether their rightness ratings indicated that the action was
wrong (0–4), neutral (5), or right (6–9). If the action was either neutral or right, but not morally wrong, then call it ‘‘permis-
sible’’ (see Table 4). We can compare permissibility judgments with behavioral action or action judgments using a McNemar
test, which shows that there were signiﬁcant differences between actions or action judgments and permissibility judgments,
Table 3
Regression models of rightness judgments in the ﬁrst task with dummy variables for actor/observer (observer = 1, actor = 0), side-track/footbridge
(footbridge = 1, side-track = 0), and whether the participant took the action/said that the actor should take the action (yes = 1, no = 0), male/female (male = 1,
female = 0). Standard errors in brackets beneath each coefﬁcient.
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant 3.21*** 3.39*** 3.36*** 3.79*** 0.70
(0.44) (0.47) (0.51) (0.61) (1.09)
Observer 1.20*** 0.83* 1.21*** 0.24 1.20***
(0.33) (0.46) (0.33) (0.77) (0.33)
Footbridge 0.83** 1.20** 1.25 0.81** 0.79**
(0.33) (0.46) (0.79) (0.33) (0.33)
TakeAction 2.98*** 2.99*** 2.79*** 2.30*** 3.05***
(0.43) (0.43) (0.55) (0.65) (0.42)
Observer ⁄ Footbridge 0.75
(0.66)
Footbridge ⁄ TakeAction 0.51
(0.87)
Observer ⁄ TakeAction 1.18
(0.85)
Age 0.11**
(0.05)
Male 0.18
(0.35)
R2 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.29
Adjusted R2 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.27
* Signiﬁcant at the 10-percent level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5-percent level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1-percent level.
Table 4
Distribution of right-neutral-wrong judgments and permissibility.
Condition Rightness judgment
Wrong Neutral Right
Side-track actor
Count 13 2 30
% 28.9% 4.4% 66.7%
Permissible 71.1%
Side-track observer
Count 7 2 35
% 15.9% 4.5% 79.5%
Permissible 84.1%
Footbridge actor
Count 18 5 21
% 40.9% 11.40% 47.7%
Permissible 59.1%
Footbridge observer
Count 10 1 32
% 23.3% 2.3% 74.4%
Permissible 76.7%
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that acting is permissible and hence that the number of participants who act (or say that action should be taken) would
be less than or equal to the number of people who judge acting permissible. However, in three out of four conditions it
was the other way round: more participants took action (or judged that action should be taken) than judged the action per-
missible (see Fig. 2). Many participants judged the action to be wrong but nevertheless took action (or judged that action
should be taken), especially among the actors in the footbridge condition.
A two-way ANOVA on the time taken for observers to make their judgment of whether the actor should take action shows
that there was no interaction effect between judgment (yes or no) and scenario, F (1, 81) = 0.462, p = 0.499. Observers who
judged that the actor should click or drag made their judgments faster than those who judged that that actor should not act, F
(1, 81) = 6.86, p = .011, g2 = .078 (small to medium effect). There was no signiﬁcant difference in timing between Side-track
and Footbridge, F (1, 81) = .047, p = 0.829.
Actors acted faster than observers made their judgments. We only have response time data for those actors who clicked or
dragged; the software timed out at 11s for those who did not act. But the actors who took action did so faster than observers
made the judgment that they should act, M = 5.13 vs. M = 6.28, t(134.9) = 3.25, p = 0.001, d = .56 (medium effect). We
Fig. 2. Percentage who judged that acting was permissible in each condition of Task 1 compared to the percentage who acted/judged that the actor should
act.
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were actually faster than all observers.
3.3. Second task
In the second task, there were no differences between groups in their propensity to take action or to say that the actor
should take action. As we saw above, the number of participants taking action or saying that the actor should take action
increased in Side-track. It seems that the numbers taking action in Footbridge in the ﬁrst task were at ceiling, and, in the
second task, the numbers taking action in Side-track increased so that they are also at ceiling.
A regression analysis shows that the actor-observer difference in rightness judgments persisted, with observers giving
higher ratings than actors, but there is no longer a difference in ratings between Side-track and Footbridge. There are no
inter-action effects and no demographic effects—the age effect we found in the ﬁrst task has disappeared—and adding extra
variables does not even improve the explanatory power of the model (see Table 5). The disappearance of differences between
Side-track and Footbridge is consistent with there being order effects. Having completed the ﬁrst task affected participants’
views about acting, and the rightness of acting, in the second task.Table 5
Regression models of rightness judgments in the second task with dummy variables for actor/observer (observer = 1, actor = 0), side-track/footbridge
(footbridge = 1, side-track = 0), and whether the participant took the action/said that the actor should take the action (yes = 1, no = 0), male/female (male = 1,
female = 0). Standard errors in brackets beneath each coefﬁcient.
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant 2.87*** 2.80*** 3.47*** 3.23*** 2.27**
(0.56) (0.58) (0.74) (0.86) (1.00)
Observer 1.63*** 1.76*** 0.45 1.62*** 1.63***
(0.29) (0.41) (1.01) (0.29) (0.29)
Footbridge 0.16 0.28 0.14 0.39 0.13
(0.29) (0.40) (0.29) (1.06) (0.29)
TakeAction 2.72*** 2.73*** 2.08*** 2.35*** 2.73***
(0.53) (0.53) (0.75) (0.87) (0.53)
Observer ⁄ footbridge 0.26
(0.57)
Observer ⁄ action 1.28
(1.05)
Footbridge ⁄ action 0.59
(1.10)
Age 0.02
(0.04)
Male 0.29
(0.31)
R2 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.24
⁄ Signiﬁcant at the 10-percent level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5-percent level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1-percent level.
Table 6
Distribution of right-neutral-wrong judgments and permissibility in the second task.
Condition Rightness judgment
Wrong Neutral Right
Side-track actor
Count 12 10 22
% 27.3% 22.7% 50.0%
Permissible 72.7%
Side-track observer
Count 4 1 38
% 9.3% 2.3% 88.4%
Permissible 90.7%
Footbridge actor
Count 13 6 26
% 28.9% 13.3% 57.8%
Permissible 71.1%
Footbridge observer
Count 2 2 40
% 4.5% 4.5% 90.9%
Permissible 95.5%
Fig. 3. Percentage who judged that acting was permissible in each condition of Task 2 compared to the percentage who acted/judged that the actor should
act.
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or said that the actor should take it. Again, we can group our participants according to whether their rightness ratings indi-
cated that the action was wrong (0–4), neutral (5), or right (6–9) and if the action was either neutral or right, but not morally
wrong, then we call it ‘‘permissible’’ (see Table 6). We found that there were signiﬁcant differences between actions/action
judgments and permissibility judgments, using a McNemar test, v2(1, 175) = 8.04, p = .005,w = .21 (small to medium). In this
task, the effect seems to be driven by the actors, in both footbridge and Side-track, who took the action despite later rating it
as wrong (see Fig. 3).
Participants reacted signiﬁcantly faster in the second task than in the ﬁrst, (M = 4.79s vs.M = 5.88s), as shown by a paired
sample t-test, t(158) = 5.72, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .45 (medium effect size). A two-way ANOVA on the time taken for observers
to make their action judgment shows that there was no interaction effect between judgment (yes or no) and scenario, F (1,
82) = .23, p = 0.635. Observers who judged that the actor should click or drag made their judgments marginally faster than
those who judged that that actor should not act, F (1, 82) = 3.71, p = 0.058, g2 = .043 (small effect). There was no signiﬁcant
difference in timing between Side-track and Footbridge, F (1, 82) = 0.32, p = 0.571.
Again, actors acted faster that observers make their judgments, comparing the actors with the observers who judged that
they should act (who we saw above were marginally faster than those who judged that the actor should not act),M = 4.03 vs.
M = 5.38, t (159) = 3.83, p < 0.001, d = .61 (medium to large effect).
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Our Side-track and Footbridge scenarios preserve the main philosophical difference between Side-track and Footbridge.
In Side-track the ﬁve are saved by diverting the ball and it is an unfortunate, but foreseen, side-effect that the one child’s
photo will be hit instead; in Footbridge, dragging the one child’s photo into the path of the ball is a necessary means to stop
the ball and save the ﬁve. Our scenarios also preserve the difference between pushing a button that moves a lever and using
muscular force to move the one into the path, with our Footbridge scenario arguably involving the application of personal
force, which Greene et al. (2009) argue inﬂuences moral judgments in trolley problems.
However, there is also evidence that Footbridge-style dilemmas elicit greater activity in brain regions involved with emo-
tional processing than Side-track-style dilemmas (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Schaich Borg et al., 2006).
Greene (2014) has argued that our automatic emotional response to Footbridge affects our moral judgments. It is not clear
whether our real-life scenarios will have preserved the difference in emotional arousal between Side-track and Footbridge.
On the one hand, there is real action involved, which should heighten arousal. But, on the other hand, the stakes are small
and dragging a child’s picture may not be as emotionally arousing as pushing someone off a footbridge. Therefore we ran a
second experiment as a manipulation check, to test whether there is a difference in emotional arousal between our Side-
track and Footbridge scenarios.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
There were 33 participants, 11 men and 22 women, aged between 18 and 28 (M = 19.64, SD = 2.23. They did the exper-
iment as a course requirement. None of the participants had done our main experiment.
4.1.2. Procedure and materials
The participants were presented with the descriptions of two similar scenarios (within subjects design), one in which the
action was ‘‘Dragging the photo of the child’’ (Footbridge) and the other was ‘‘Clicking the switch to move the lever’’ (Side-
track). The scenarios were precise descriptions of the experiment described in Section 2.3, which the main study participants
had taken part in. The presentation order of the two scenarios was counterbalanced. At the end of the main scenario they
were given the options ‘‘Consider your options: OPTION A – Clicking the switch to move the lever, resulting in the ﬁve chil-
dren keeping their meals and the one child losing his meal. OPTION B – Not intervening, resulting in the ﬁve children losing
their meals and the one child keeping his meal.’’
After each scenario they were asked (in randomly presented order)
1. Which do you feel worse about doing? (1 Much more option A to 7 Much more option B, with 4 No difference).
2. Which arouses more emotion? (1 Much more option A to 7 Much more option B, with 4 No difference).
3. Which is more upsetting? (1 Much more option A to 7 Much more option B, with 4 No difference).
After they had completed both scenarios a ﬁnal screen asked them to compare the two scenarios:
4. Thinking back to both scenarios you have just read about, if you were actually forced to take action, which of the two
actions (dragging the photo vs. clicking the switch) would you feel worse about doing? (1 Dragging the photo to 7 Clicking
the switch, with 4 Equal).
4.2. Results
In the direct comparison between the two tasks, participants overwhelmingly judged that they would feel worse about
dragging the photo than clicking the switch. A one sample t-test comparing the results to a neutral score of 4 showed that the
mean rating of 2.18 (SD = 1.31) was signiﬁcantly different from the neutral point of 4, t(32) = 7.973, p < .001, d = 1.389 (veryTable 7
Means and standard deviations in ratings task (1 = clicking/dragging, 7 = not intervening).
Question Scenario
Side-track Footbridge
Which feels worse? M = 3.82 M = 3.70
SD = 2.02 SD = 2.08
Which arouses more emotion? M = 4.00 M = 3.79
SD = 1.64 SD = 2.07
Which is more upsetting? M = 4.18 M = 4.42
SD = 1.65 SD = 1.92
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that none of them would feel worse about clicking the switch than dragging the photo.
However, comparing how participants felt about taking action versus not taking action, there were no signiﬁcant differ-
ences in mean ratings between scenarios. The means and standard deviations are reported in Table 7. Thus, on average, par-
ticipants did not think that acting as compared to not intervening would make them feel worse or more upset or more
emotional in one scenario than in the other. (In addition, in both scenarios, the mean was close to the neutral midpoint.)
However, this is consistent with the absolute level of feeling bad, upset, or emotional for both acting and not intervening
being higher in Footbridge. It could be that participants thought that the two options in each scenario would make them feel
equally bad, but the level of bad feeling was higher in Footbridge. That would be consistent with our ﬁnding that participants
rated dragging the photo in Footbridge as feeling worse than clicking the switch in Side-track.
Participants also found Footbridge more emotionally arousing than Side-track. The absolute rating of ‘‘emotional arousal’’
(distance from mid-point irrespective of direction) varied between scenarios with Footbridge being more emotional than
Side-track (mean of 1.79 compared to 1.27 from the neutral mid-point), t(32) = 2.781, p = .009, d = .512 (medium effect).
This contrasts with the two questions about feeling ‘‘worse’’ or ‘‘upsetting’’, where absolute ratings did not differ. Emotional
arousal goes beyond feeling bad; it can include positive emotions or even just the feeling of being ‘‘on edge’’. Participants
may have thought that these feelings would be greater in Footbridge than in Side-track.
5. Discussion
In our real-life trolley problem, where people could choose whether or not one person should incur a small economic
harm in order to save ﬁve others, by either clicking a switch (Side-track) or dragging the photo of the one (Footbridge),
we found that there were no signiﬁcant differences in behavior. However, the action was judged to be more right in Side-
track than in Footbridge, and was also judged to be more right by observers (who did not have the possibility of taking
action) than by actors (who had actually faced the choice). These differences in ratings were found in addition to differences
associated with whether or not the actor actually took the action or whether the observer said that the actor should take the
action. It is natural to expect that people who took action or thought it should be taken would also think that it was more
right, but the positive relationship also captures any differences due to participants justifying their previous decisions. There
were no signiﬁcant interaction effects, which implies that the Side-track–Footbridge effect and actor-observer effect in right-
ness occurred both for participants who took action or said action should be taken and those who did not.
Contra the prediction of the Akrasia Hypothesis, there were no signiﬁcant differences in the percentage of actors who took
the action and the percentage of observers who said they should, which suggests that actors were acting in accordance with
their ‘‘all-things-considered’’ best judgments. We did not ask actors for their all-things-considered judgments in our exper-
iment because there would have been a clear motive to report an all-things-considered judgment that was consistent with
their previous behavior. Whether there are actor-observer differences in overall judgments remains to be tested. However, in
the absence of evidence for differences, we consider the all-things-considered judgments of our observers about what the
actor should do to be a good proxy.
We suggest that the gap between people’s moral judgments about acting and their actual behavior occurs because moral
judgments about taking action are not overall judgments. Other results support this interpretation. Kurzban et al. (2012)
found that in the standard version of Footbridge (their ‘‘stranger condition’’), 85% of participants said that it was wrong
to push the man in Footbridge but 28% of them said that they would push him; in Side-track 46% said that pulling the switch
was wrong but 77% said they would pull. As with our results, there must have been participants who answered that the
action was wrong but also predicted that they would act. This is a blow for any moral theory that strictly associates moral
judgments with moral behavior, such as that of Hare (1952, 1963). However, Kurzban et al. also asked whether it was wrong
not to take action, and they found that 50% of participants in Footbridge and 30% in Side-track answered ‘‘yes’’ to both ques-
tions, indicating that they thought it was both wrong to act and wrong not to act.
Our data might be seen as an example of a phenomenon that Williams (1981) reports in his discussion of the problem of
‘‘dirty hands’’. Williams argued that sometimes taking the right action may involve doing something morally discreditable,
with a victim who could justly complain about having been wronged. In these cases, even though one should take action,
acting still involves doing a moral wrong, which leaves a stain on the character of the actor. As applied to our data, this sug-
gests that participants tended to think that, overall, one should take the action which leaves most children with meals, but
that this still involved wronging the one child (and more so in Footbridge than in Side-track). We see this pattern of judg-
ments amongst our observers. Hence, one might conclude, following Williams, that it is morally bad luck to ﬁnd oneself in
the situation of having to make a decision in Footbridge.
We found differences between actors and observers, but not the ones that are predicted by the Differing Perspectives
Hypothesis. In fact, our results were the exact opposite of the predictions of the Differing Perspectives Hypothesis. There
were no differences between actions and action judgments, but there was a persistent difference between the rightness
judgments of our actors and observers, with observers judging the behavior as more right than actors. This is consistent with
previous results found using a hypothetical trolley problem. Nadelhoffer and Feltz (2008) varied whether the decision maker
was supposed to be the subject herself (actor condition) or a third person called John (observer condition), and found that
90% of the participants in the observer condition judged that it was morally permissible for John to hit the switch, but only
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replicated this result, with real agents making decisions that had real effects.
It is well known in attribution theory that there are differences between actors and observers in the explanation of behav-
ior, with actors being more likely to cite situational constraints—the Fundamental Attribution Error (Ross & Nisbett, 1991)—
so it should not come as a surprise that these show up as differences in moral judgments about self or other’s actions. Con-
sistent with the Fundamental Attribution Error, Nadelhoffer and Feltz (2008) also found that observers rated John as having
more control over the outcome than actors rated themselves as having. Other research also shows that there are actor-obser-
ver differences in attributions of responsibility and freedom (Harvey, Harris, & Barnes, 1975). This suggests a possible expla-
nation of our ﬁndings: others are regarded as having more control over the situation and hence it is more incumbent on them
to act.
Another explanation for the difference in moral judgments between actors and observers draws on the dual process the-
ory of Greene et al. (2001, 2004). According to Greene and colleagues, we have a prepotent negative emotional response to
the action in Footbridge, which provokes an automatic negative moral judgment. Actors are more likely to have an emotional
response than observers to the idea that they harm someone, which could cause them to make more negative moral judg-
ments than observers.
Our results are consistent with the Separate Processing Hypothesis. Most observers judged that the actor should act and
judgments that ‘‘yes’’ the actor should act were faster than ‘‘no’’ judgments. This is in contrast with evidence that we have of
automatic negativemoral judgment in Footbridge. Increasing time pressure leads to more ‘‘wrong’’ judgments in Footbridge-
style dilemmas than in Side-track-style dilemmas (Suter & Hertwig, 2011). Cognitive load increases the time it takes to judge
that acting would be morally right in Footbridge-style dilemmas, but there is no difference in time taken to make judgments
that acting would be morally wrong (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008). However, we found no differ-
ences in response time between Side-track and Footbridge, and no interaction effect between scenario and action judgment.
Whether an interaction effect should be expected is uncertain—Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, and Cohen (2001)
claimed to ﬁnd one but Greene (2009) agreed with McGuire, Langdon, Coltheart, and Mackenzie (2009) that the effect
occurred only in one scenario—but the ﬁnding that ‘‘yes’’ action judgments are faster than ‘‘no’’ is the opposite of what is
expected given the dual process theory of moral judgments. It is possible that moral judgment is more inﬂuenced by emotion
than moral decisions, which is consistent with the hypothesis that the two processes rely on different psychological mech-
anisms. We do not have the response times for our participants’ moral judgments, but the shape of them is consistent with
the dual process theory of moral judgments, whereas neither the shape nor the timings of the action judgments are consis-
tent with them being driven by a prepotent negative response.
We found order effects in behavior in our two tasks. Actors and observers who saw Side-track second were signiﬁcantly
more likely to take action than those who saw it ﬁrst, leading to behavior that was more consistent with their prior response
to Footbridge. Schwitzgebel and Cushman (2012) also found that responses in Side-track were more malleable than those in
Footbridge. Their respondents were more likely to give the same moral goodness rating to both Footbridge and Side-track
when Footbridge was presented ﬁrst. We also found that signiﬁcant differences in rightness ratings between Side-track
and Footbridge disappeared in the second task. Our results contribute to a growing pool of evidence that judgments in trolley
problems depend on the order in which they are encountered, which casts doubt on whether they can be used to provide
evidence for moral principles (Liao, Wiegmann, Alexander, & Vong, 2012).
Investigations of real-life trolley problems are novel and it is hard to know what to conclude from the comparison with
hypothetical life and death scenarios. Experiments with real consequences necessarily have smaller stakes and people are
more risk seeking when the stakes are small (Weber & Chapman, 2005). The small stakes should tend to decrease emotional
arousal but having to make a decision with real-life consequences should increase arousal. We found differences in emo-
tional arousal for our Side-track and Footbridge scenarios but we do not know how the magnitude of the difference compares
with the hypothetical life and death versions. However, despite the uncertainties involved in the comparison, real-life small
stakes work is important. After all, most of our everyday moral decisions involve small stakes, so investigation of real-life
small stakes decisions is important for understanding moral behavior.
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